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REPRIEVE IN VIET NAM 
One of the by-products of the struggle between communism and 
fre e dom is a kind of geographic schizophrenia in the Far East. On the 
fringes of communist power in Asia one finds a split Korea, a partitioned 
V .et Nam and two Chinas. In each case the division is regarded on both 
sides as temporary. Mao Tse-tung vow s that he will take Formosa and 
Chiang Kai-shek reiterates that the nationalists will return to the Asian 
mainland. Syngman Rhee grows impatient to join the northern half of 
his country to the Republic of Korea and the communists in turn insist 
that sooner or later the Korean peninsula will be unified by them. Ho Chih 
Minh regards Viet Nam south of the 17th paralell as only temporarily out 
of h i s grasp. Ngo Dinh Diem 1s confident that eventually the country 
will be reunited under the free government which he now leads in Saigon. 
With the possible exception of the Formosa-China split, it is 
reasonable to assume that these competitors are correct in regarding 
the various divisions as temporary. The partitions have occurred in 
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nations which are contiguous(again
1 
excepting Formos~ and otherwise 
quite similar in race, culture, language and outlook. Although Korea, 
VietNam and China have been divided several times before in h i story 
invariably these centripetal forces have drawn them together again. 
American policy at least towards Korea and Viet Nam has 
generally supported the concept of unification. It has also been a policy 
of negative preference, our principal concern being that these countries 
should not be unified by the Chinese communi sts, or those responsive 
to them. We have gone to great and expensive lengths to sustain this 
preference. To save Korea from communist unification we remobilized 
tW 
our armed forces, engaged I' large part of them on the distant battle-
fields of that peninsula and have spent billions of dollars to maintai n 
the Republic under Syngman Rhee. To preserve Formosa from the 
same fate we have allocated enormous sums to the Chinese nationalists, 
stationed a fleet between the island and the mainland and even threatened 
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to g o to war ourselves. In VietNam, we backed the French and non-communist 
VietNamese allied with them with billions of dollars in aid. While we 
have not actually committed ourselves to war to prevent communist 
()'~ IJ, ~ 11~; 
unfication~ it was not for want of official voices advocating such a course. 
Since the defeat of the French Expeditionary force/ in the great 
battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, our policy in VietNam has supported 
(JJ 1t. ~ . 
not merely anti -communism but Vietnamese who ~edicated to 
,.... " " 
unifying VietNam on the basis of full national independence. While e....u ~ ~ 
our policy has ~ become more pos i tive, our activity in VietNam has 
.Jt.(~ 
~more modest and so have our words. It is somewhat ironic 
therefore that where we are doing the least~~ the 
prospects for success are the best. Not only is there a good chance 
of realiz ing the negative objective of preventing the communist 
unification of VietNam, there is even the possibility of a positive 
advance of freedom. 
ac 
A key to this anomaly is to be found in the charter of the man 
" 
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who now heads the free goverrunent of Viet Nam. Te p n• 1 1 • .e ~ 
leadership 1s a revealing index to the situation in any country. That 
~ 
is the case, whether haau ehip is regarded primarily as molding the 
forces within a sociefo r as giving them expression. There is a 
difference in a United K ingdom headed by a Churchill and by an Eden. 
A subtle change has taken place in the United States ance leadership 
passed to the team in the unfortunate incapacitation of the President. 
It is difficult to envision the direction in which India might have 
gone in the past quarter century without first a Gandhi and then a 
Nehru and in that order. 
In some respects, the leadership factor as a molder rather than 
an expressor of the social forces in a country is more significant 
in Asia than in the West at the present tim~ 
( The recent shock of independence has left these countries 
in a very amorphous state. They are nations turning on a kind of giant 
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potter's wheel. The fingers which shape them before the clay hardens 
will have much to do with their ultimate forms. 
It is not by accident that elections in many Asian countries are 
being conducted with ballots which show the portraits of contesting 
candidates side by side. More than a technique of voting .is involved; 
there is a certain symbolism. The voter tears the ballot apart, 
deposits his preference carefully in the box and casts the other into 
the dust. 
If Viet Nam has not set in the communist mold as was almost 
universally expected a year or so ago, it is due in large part to the 
man who heads the free government in the southern half of the country. 
A year ago Ngo Dinh Diem was a lonely figure in Saigon. He had beeh 
brought back from self-imposed exile abroad to serve as President 
when the Communist tide in VietNam wa• at its :::t::' He inherited 
a government in chaos, run by a coalition whose only clairn.f.o authority 
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were ~ guns and ~influence with the Ex-Emperor Bao Dai. It 
was composed of the gangsters<' and ex-river pirates of the Binh 
Xuyen semi-secret organization, the mystical quasi-religious sects 
of the countryside known as the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai and by colonial 
::Cwtk!J li hangers-on. The demoralized Vietnamese army was a 
separate force, with a chief-of- staff nourishing expectations of 
satYo.yky 
establishing a military -~ m south VietNam. This weird 
conglomeration was held grimly together by the French Ministry for 
the As so cia ted States and the French Expeditionary Corp sf\ Bno Dai, . 
who bore the title of ~hie£ of State served as the instrumentali~l',:~~'~) 
orders and edicts from Cannes on the French Rivera. 
While the various elements of power alternately vied and 
cooperated with each other in the struggle for power in Saigon, the 
Communist Viet Minh under Ho Chih M i nh strengthened their grip 
on the country. The Geneva truce had consigned the northern half 
of the country to the Viet Minh and they promptly fastened on it an 
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author i tarian regime modeled after that of Communist China. Below 
the 17th parallel, underground Communist cadres and organizers w e r e the 
real power in tn.uch of the countryside. They were the government even 
where officials nominally responsive to Saigon sat in the provincial 
and local offices. The people accepted Communist leadership partly in 
terror but mostly because there was no real Vietnamese alternative 
in Saigon. 
In the jungle of <..:olonial decay, co~·ruption and military defeat 
which characterized Saigon in 1954, Diem assumed the presidency 
with few assets other than his nationalism, his personal incorruptability 
and courage and his idealistic determination to create a free Viet Nam. 
In addition, he had s ome cautious support from the American Embassy, 
the gratitude of several hundred th ousand poverty- stricken refugees 
whom he had insisted upon evacuating from the communist north, and 
the sympathy of a few small Vietnamese nationalist organizations. 
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Diem found few allies among the French and Vietnamese officials 
and military officers who crowded into Saigon in the wake of the defeat 
at Dien Bien Phu. The Army leaders ignored his directives and 
constantly threatened him with rebellion. When Diem showed his 
opposition to corruption the Binh Xuyen tossed warning bombs into 
his residence. Colonial hacks, with straight faces, found him 'unpopular''· r 
French colons complained of his "stubborness" and "inexperience". 
w~ ~ w..l~~ ~ ~ 1 ~~~ 
'i1h:ts e wet e ei~Pl8 t!fta ~ n the authority of the Saigon 
government mio~ht be extende4 into the south Vietnamese country side, 
the Hoa Hao and Gao Daist sects branished their independent armed 
bands at the upstart in Saigon who threatened their rights. The "rights!' 
it might be noted were government subsidies and autonomous control of 
large areas of the countryside. In these areas the sects had the 
unchallenged prstvilege of exploiting the inhabitants in return for 
"protection", 'ystical quasi-religious services and anti-communism. 
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~iem constituted a threat to all these special interests 
_.........~, 
~ ~ ) .,) ;\ _. ~JJ."" 
;... the sects"- the 
colonial bureaucracy, tA e :a;nb x ... ye.a •aelce k€1 9 and the •• ~ 
~~~ 
~rh:usal 1 dt?s allied with Bao Dai. Their reactio~took the form 
of subversion of his constructive program by inertia, outright 
opposition and conspiracy to bring about his removal. The not very 
remote danger of the Viet Minh seemed to concern them far less 
than the immediate ~~£ Diem. .,4 ...... _.,l -' ~ ~'-k 
' _, // £ J .,t. ..~.~ ~ ... 
~~L ~.,..- ~ l:n•· ~ ""- ~
~~ -r~~~. 
In Saigon, in the fall of 1954, the tea-cup gossip measured ~ ~- • ~ 
~..~ 
political career, if not his life, in days and even hours.~ D. em
1
acted 
" 
as though it would last forever. O utside the Palace of Independence, 
' . A w ~~ .!1.~ r~ 1 ) ~ 
1\. the clamor of opposition rose. The more ~ ignored it, the more 
furious it became. 
He was critized abroad for doing nothing and at horne for do ing 
too much. Actually, he was doing the only thing he could do. He 
was manuevering to free himself irom the web of corruption and 
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decadence and the v/' stiges of a 1 • ./ , 8 colonial~ in which he had been 
enmeshed from the moment he assumed the Presidency. He was attempting 
to separate and dissolve the strands of this web which stretched from Paris 
and Cannes to Saigon and into the Vietnamese provinces. He used 
his meager resources with great political skill to accomplish this 
purpose. 
Actually each core of Diem's opposition in 1954 was a part of 
the bankrupt legacy which he inherited when he assumed the Presidency. 
Put together, they revealed why half of Ebax VietNam had fallen 
to the Communist leader Ho Chih Minh and the balance threatened 
despite the presence of a French Expeditionary Force of 300, 000 men 
and the lavish expenditures of billions in American aid. 
The case of the Vietnamese army was symptomatic of the 
whole. This army was trained by the French and equipped and 
s q:>ported by the United States. It was initially designed not 
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;p int& lly as an instrumentality of a free Vietnamese Government but as a 
~L 
supplement to French Expeditionary Corps to assist in holding back the 
/... 
communist Viet Minh. Despite modern training and copious suppl~it 
~ 
failed to ~ effective ly even in this l imited function. After the fighting 
carne to an end, moreover, it became a serious divisive force in south 
Viet Narn. When Diem attempted to convert the army into an element 
of national strengt~ the chief-of- sta~wlro ::as a V,..etnarnese ~f French 
w;' ~~ ~··~ ~ 
citizenship openly defied his orders. He war 99hheiwh  
~~~ 
""*l:R F als from the French Expeditionary Corps or those issuing 
from Bao Dai in Cannes. 
When Dicrn•s' stubbornes~ forced the removal of the rebellious 
chie£.of-staff last November, the first step was taken in unravelling the 
strands of the web which had held him a virtual prisoner in the presidential 
Palace. He had in effect shifted the Vietnamese army from an independent 
and obstructive position into one subordinate to his government. Had he 
not been successful there would have been no opportunity to push a constructi/e 
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program in VietNam. The gulf which already separated the army from the 
V etnamese people could only have grown larger. In the end, th~s force would 
{ hav~n all prob~b~lityj degenerated into an oppressive war-lordism and by 
C<J·~; 
further alienating the people paved the way for the triumph of the~Viet 
Minh throughout the country. 
~y 
Diem's challenge came from the Binh Xuyen and the sects, 
" 
particularly the Hoa Hao. The Binh Xuyen was literally a government 
within the government. It was the organized brotherhood of the corrupt 
and the lawless in and around Saigon-Cholon. Backed by regular armed 
bands, it had grown powerful on extortion, the drug traffic, gambling 
and other questiorable activities. By breaking its ties with the communists 
who had previously bought it off, the Binh Xuyen had risen to a 
1foo•# 
position of quasi-respectibility at least in Colonial circles. Although 
" 
the organization continued to tap the revenues of illicit occupations, 
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the .S,..~ 
its leaders became pillars of strength in/government . Its leaderf ~ 
--r~~· 
served as president before Diem. a~d. ltis son wcrn tiw teeeliioao dti..., ,..... 
e£ s Mjji gf the a e p:". When Diem came to power, Bao Dai took 
the precaution of placing control of the police ps "el and the national 
gendamerie in the hands of the Binh Xuyen. It became, therefore, aJ- ,...u... 
principal enforcer a! Ca'!e-::f the law in Saigon-Cholon. " . the 
What the Binh Xuyen was to ~s•.:ti~ th~Ha~~ N-,) 
was to the countryside. Their armed bands, supported by 
subsidies from Saigon and by exactions from the peasants held the 
villages in a state of acquiescent terror. 
Previous governments in Saigon had made t~r peace with 
(J'V 
these groups by buying them d.f doing nothing to curb their 
1'-
Leaaex s of e'he !Hnh ~uyen w li Hoa Hao 
Having little support among the 
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people, the succession of ineffective governments in Saigon had to 
rely increasingly on these ,6ppressors of the people to preserve 
even the fiction of ruling. The more they relied on them, the mre 
~:1~·1. , H....·~"·' r 
they ~the people. 
When Diem began to call a halt to the patronizing of the Binh 
Xuyen and the sects, he was called ''inexperienced" and "uncompromising••. 
When he closed the gambling casinos in Saigon-Cholon on which the 
Binh Xuyen relied for a large part of its revenue, he was called a 
"mad man". When he cut off the subsidies to the sects, it was "the 
end". 
Diem ignored these criticisms and the repeated exhortations 
to compromise with the dissident groups. In the meantime he was 
strengthening the government's control over the Vietnamese army~~------
command and persuading 1 eading generals of the Cao Dai sect to 
join the nationalist cause. With the Hoa Hao and the Binh Xuyen 
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however, there could be no compromise. They would accept no 
arrangement which impaired their privileged position of atltonomous 
power. D em could not concede that and still expect to lead the 
Vietnamese people/sensing their power slipping the Binh Xuyen and 
the Hoa Hao launched a simultaneous rebellion in an effort to 
overthrow Diem in the spring of 1955. Bao Dai who had ·not dared to 
remove the President because of the latter 1 s growing influence m 
VietNam and his support from the United States, made a circuito us 
attempt to aid the rebels . As soon as the revolution had broken out, 
he switched chiefs-of-staff of the army in order to p revent the government 
from dealing with the outbreak. For 24 hours Diem's fate hung in 
balance. In the end, however, Bao Dai's action was ignored. The 
army remained loyal to Diem and after a brief and bloody struggle 
..,J~~~ 
in the streets of Saigon-Cholon the revolt was crushed. ,. 
Both the Binh Xuyen and the Hoa Hao were driven from the 
,.. 
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capitol. The remnants of the Binh Xuyen fled to the swamps along the 
river some miles south of Saigon. It was from this area that they had 
originally emerged as river pirates to develop the organization that 
" 
eventually held all Saigon-Cholon in its grasp. The Hao Hao retreated 
to the west. Broken into small bands, they took refuge in tift remote 
mountains near the Cambodian borders. 
The power of both of these dissident groups has been broW en. 
ru..L.t '. ~~ 
v-~ they still retain a capacity for harrassing the government it is 
"-
on the level of piracy and band~try. Both organizations are reported 
to be negotiating with the Viet Minh in an effort to recoup their 
shattered fortunes. If they are successful, however, it will be 
a measure of the gDowing weakness of the communists not of their 
strength. 
-
By accepting the ''war of the sects", rather than • permit~ 
a continuance of the antonomous power of the Binh Xuyen and the Hoa 
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Hao which was the price of peace, Diem lost the pt:op of several 
thousand armed mercanaries in the conflict with the communists. 
~ 
~giving tangible evidence of a leadership in Sa gon that would act 
for and not against the people, he gained far more. He gained 
the loyalty of the national army. He gained the confidence of numerous 
V ietnamese who had been exploited and degraded by the Binh Xuyen, 
the sects and their accomplices among the French colons. He gained 
the respect of free foreign nations and even the communists who 
recognized that a dangerous opponent had appeared in Saigon. 
In a recent plebescite in south Viet Nam, Diem 1 s picture 
was placed in the ballot box and that of Bao Dai discarded by almost 
all of the 6 million people who voted. Before the election it was 
apparent that this would be the result. Bao Dai had long since lost any 
~ 
significant following if, ~n fact, he had ever had one in Viet Na~ ,.Mis 
key role in th...,e conspiracy to overthrow Di~ has been the last 
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strawfwhat was implied in this election, however, was more important 
than the actual confirmation of the Ex-Emperor's unpopularity. The 
elevation of Diem to chief -of- state was an indication that the people 
wanted a goverrunent which would derive its power primarily from them. 
~ 
It was a reflection of their search for a leader/t\Vould respond to their 
needs rather than to those of a foreign power and t~ native groups 
allied with it. They sensed that Diem could provide that kind of 
..jb 
leader ship. It is significant that not onl y Bao Dai but Viet Minh as well aett~h4. 
" 
t<> pnoeut the eleelieu. ~ P- 1 M,.o~' 
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Diem has come an incredible distance in less than two years. 
He has taken what was a lost cause of freedom in Viet Nam and breathed 
new life into it. Until now, the principal challenge which has confronted 
him has been to sweet away the accumulated debris of a half-century of 
colonial inertia. That challenge has been met with great political skill . 
The road ahead for Diem, however, is in some ways more 
difficult than the one he has already negotiated . At the present time, he 
weilds great personal power 1n south Viet Nam, comparable to that of 
Ho Chih Minh in the north. His principal task now is to translate this 
power into a people 1 s power . H e must lead in the construction of a 
free nation almost from the ground up and to do so under the constant 
~ 
pressure of the Viet ~. 
The task involves 1n the first instance the development of new 
political institutions which will provide adequate channels of representation 
from the people to the government. Deposing Bao Dai has cleared the 
way for this effort and Diem has indicated that he will act promptly to 
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establish a constitutional government. The old opera house in Saigon 
is even now being refitted to house an elected constituent assembly when 
it is convened. 
He has also shown an awareness of the need to tackle promptly 
the vast problems of economic and social reconstruction which exist in 
south Viet Nam. These affect primarily the people of the rural areas 
who constitute the great bulk of the population. Edicts have already been 
promulgated to alleviate the conditions of the farmers and now that the 
dissidents have been brought under control, it should be possible to carry 
them out with increasing effectiveness. 
There is also the need to perfect the armed forces. The "war 
of the sects" indicated that there had been a vast improvement in the 
morale and leadership of the Army since Diem has been in office. Recent 
comments of Gener~ O':~el, head of the United States military 
mission at Saigon, also reflect very favorably on the national army. A 
~) ~ 
need exi~ts~n Viet Nam
7
as in most Asian countrie~here men with weapons 
,;--
have long been associated with oppression to root the army deeply in the 
populace. 
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These are the principal challenges which confront the Diem 
government. There are others, including the development of a whole 
new set of attitudes and relationships with respect to foreign nations . 
It is 
fr/)AA~ 
not easy to pass quickly from the bitternes ses engendered b y 
" colonial dependency into new ties based upon national equality and 
mutual benefit. 
conflict is very 
Yet the need to do so in a world of sharp ideological 
great~dea\ing with these problems Diem is no longer 
alone , He has a growing following among young articulate Vietnamese 
and increasing mass support . ~ 
~so has the assistance of the United States and othe, free 
nations. Before the Diem government came to power, American aid was 
probably more ineffective in Viet Nam than anywhere else in the world . 
It is now a positive asset in the situation. It should be noted, however, 
that large-scale aid can be at best only a stop- gap, not only in VietNam 
but in any country where it is employed . The efforts of the people them-
selves must ultimately provide the key to genuine freedom . American 
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aid is not a panacea. It is helpful if it stimulates the constructive 
energies of the recipients . It can be wasteful and harmful if it serves 
to stifle those energies by building unnecessary reliance on this 
country. The Vietnamese have not removed their dependency on one 
foreign country only to shift it to another. 
Jl-- · · th ~r~~• "1~· h 1 ........., b · RQSOtgces exJ st lp SO.IJ .,.._~IJJ wulC can eupp y ~om:: a!Jt 
.'X.Q.e..countzyd.a ow in a difficult transition fTom a coloni'al o a fi'"ee 
base and assistance from the United States can b£ oi Earticular importan.. 
at this time provided it is consciously and intelligently designed to put a 
1n the long run, the free south is in a better position than th 
communist north to unify all of Viet Nam. Its advantag liee;;;nobonly: i 
a superiority of resources but in tlie funaamental difference be we n 
~edom and totalitarianism . While the north therefore is lik:e1y to come 
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available in Viet Nam which can supply the basis for an independent 
national existence if they are effectively utilized. The economy of the 
country, however, is now in a difficult transition from a colonial to an 
independent base. Assistance from the United States, therefore, can be 
of particular importance at this time. It must be designed consciously 
and intelligently to help put a strong economic floor under Vietnamese 
'~ 
independence if it is to be useful. 
The free south is potentially in a better position than the 
communist north to unify VietNam. Its advantage lies not only in a 
superiority of resources but in the fact that it is oriented towards 
freedom rather than totalitarianism . While the north is likely to come 
increasingly under the domination of communist China) the south can 
grow steadily more independent. In short, Diem's star is likely to 
;J/iA'. -1-o 
remain in the ascendancy and that of Ho Chih Minh MliiCl fade because 
the former is following a course which more closely meets the needs 
and aspirations of the Vietnamese peop le. 
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This likelihood may well explain the sense of urgency which 
the communists have exhibited on the question of unifying the country. 
It may even lead them to attempt a military coup before it is too late. 
If Diem continues to pursue the building of a free nation in south Viet Nam 
with the same perceptiveness, courage and sure-handedness which he has 
so far displayed, he will be ready for elections on unification when the· 
conditions for a free choice exist in Viet Narn . Will the Viet Minh be 
willing to accept them at that time? It is doubtful1but if they do, it v;::rti ~ 
~ be N go Dinh Diem 1 s picture that will go in the ballot box while that of 
Ho Chih Minh is cast into the dust . 
